The main goal of this thesis is to discuss different approaches to solve public good provision problem. The definition of the public good and what troubles yields its funding are presented in the section \ref{sec:pg}.

In the scope of the study is comparison of varying classical concepts of fair distribution such as utilitarianism or egalitarianism and derived from them various tax methods. Distributive justice is widely referred in chapter \ref{cha:dj} divided into several sections containing taxation schemes (section \ref{sec:ts}), collective utility functions (section \ref{sec:cw}) and social choice (section \ref{sec:sc}).

Examined are also different models of the agent (section \ref{sec:ma}) and how it may affect social choice in game-theoretic point of view. Remarks on the game theory are presented in section \ref{sec:gt}.

Above all it is all represented by the means of theoretical framework of mechanism design wich is introduced in section \ref{sec:md}. Additional criteria used to analyze capability of the mechanism are shown in chapter \ref{cha:pc}.

Possible solutions to public good provision are shown on example of local safety system. Problem is described in section \ref{sec:pd} and formulated as a mathematical model in section \ref{sec:tm}. Applied methods are discussed in chapter \ref{cha:am} and summarized in chapter \ref{cha:su}. Further possibilities of research are proposed in chapter \ref{cha:dr}.
